Civil Rights Events

Albany Movement

Filling the Jails

 

Students at the local Black college, Albany State, were anxious to launch protests against segregation. They were in a rebellious mood toward the conservative campus administration and pushed the college president to address their demands about conditions on campus.

 

Sherrod and Reagon concluded that it was important to create a mass movement in the regional metropolis before working in the rurals where Black people made up a majority of the population. The duo from SNCC began conversations with students on Albany State’s campus but were quickly kicked out by a nervous school administration. But it was too late, Sherrod wrote, “We delivered the idea that would disrupt the system” (October 4).

 

Charles Sherrod ... slowly gained the confidence of the people by living with them, working in the community, and giving voice to the aspirations of the people. His work there, along with Charles Jones and Cordell Reagon, was a model of the way an "outside" group works with a community anywhere in the South. Never in a hurry, the task was to lift fear that engulfed the Albany Negroes, continue the momentum of the previous spring, and teach the people what their rights and potentialities might be. The leadership was one of encouragement from the middle, rather than a take charge one (Browning 1).

 

On November 1, Sherrod and Reagon went to the Greyhound terminal to witness the results of an attempt made by Albany State College students to integrate waiting room facilities.

 

When the SNCC pair arrived, however, they saw only a small group of Albany policemen, headed by Chief Pritchett. The pair was confused over the lack of student support. The absence of student protestors resulted from a Youth Council decision to postpone the test without informing Sherrod or Reagon. As a result, the SNCC secretaries quietly slipped out of the terminal.

 

Leaving the station, Sherrod and Reagon found the Albany community in a state

of chaos.  … The fear of openly defying the status quo of segregation motivated inaction in the community, even among supposed student supporters. Sherrod and Reagon eventually prodded nine students back to the Trailways bus station, but only with intense cajoling. Arriving at the station, the nine students attempted to seat themselves in the white waiting room. Almost immediately, Chief Pritchett ordered the students to disperse. Obeying, the students retreated back to town to confer with Sherrod and Reagon. Though extremely minor by later standards of protest, the students’ attempt to desegregate the station led to widespread black interest in protest activities, even among adults who had previously shunned the methods of the SNCC secretaries. The SNCC workers’ organizing had elicited fear and panic, but the students’ action led to black community support that was otherwise absent. In order to challenge the city from a legal standpoint, the NAACP and other Albany adults agreed to support a test arrest at the station.

 

Realizing the need to organize the community, the leaders of SNCC, the NAACP,

and other groups met on November 17, 1961, to form what became known as the Albany Movement.  The Movement selected William G. Anderson, a local doctor, to head the

Movement as its president, recommended by C.B. King, a well-respected black lawyer.

C.B. King may have been motivated by the fact that Anderson “was a relative newcomer

and had not had the opportunity to make a lot of enemies around town” (Nelligan 7-9).

 

Interviewed in 1985, Dr. Anderson recalled: “A number of the civic and social organizations sort of got together and—and decided all in one night—the people in the community apparently are ready for whatever is happening. We are their leaders. And we are not ready for what the people appear to be ready for. So we decided at that time it would be better for us local leaders to give some direction to whatever is happening than for these outsiders to give that direction. So we decided … then that we representatives of the established civic and social organizations of the city of Albany should bind ourselves together. And we should become a part of what was happening, because the people apparently are ready for a change, and we their leaders have not taken the lead in this endeavor. And so after a good deal of conversation about what shall we call ourselves? And naturally we tossed around all sorts of names, but when the … words ‘Albany Movement’ were spoken it sort of took hold at that time” (Interview 3).

 

Up to this point, protest in Albany remained limited to actions by students trained

and counseled by Sherrod and Reagon. The small scale protest that resulted at the

Trailways terminal on November 1 and the ensuing student enthusiasm made many

blacks feel obligated to support their own children by joining in on protest activities.

“The kids were going to do it anyway,” local parent and later activist Irene Wright stated.

“They were holding their own mass meetings and making plans…we didn’t want them to

have to do it alone.” While many black adults favored the legal action and negotiation

promulgated by the NAACP to direct positive action, they nevertheless supported SNCC

protest because of their children’s involvement in it. As a result, a committee was formed

[that]“petitioned the City Council to set into place some mechanism…of desegregating the City of Albany,” as well as preparing for more positive action, such as demonstrations and arrests.  The support of the parents was important, but there existed a great divide between support and dedication. More reluctant members of the community now supported the Movement. The question now would be whether that support would translate into action.

 

…

 

Headed by Mayor Asa Kelley, the City Council had a notable history of ignoring any and every complaint brought before it by the black community.  Prior to the Albany Movement, most of these complaints centered around maintenance of public works in African-American communities, such as unpaved streets and sidewalks. The pattern of ignoring black community issues continued, as Anderson’s initial audience with the City Council ended in him being told that the council “determined that there is no common ground for discussion, and did not deem it appropriate to have it as an agenda item.” The next day the local newspaper, the Albany Herald, answered for the white establishment even more emphatically. The paper characterized Anderson as a hothead, and decried any attempt to change the status quo in Albany, going so far as to list Anderson’s address and telephone number for any “interested” party, which would be used by whites to threaten and bother Anderson throughout his time as president of the Albany Movement (Nelligan 10, 12-13).

 

On November 22, just a few days before the Thanksgiving holiday, three young people from the NAACP youth council and two SNCC volunteers from Albany State were arrested in the Trailways terminal. The NAACP youth council members were released on bond immediately after their arrest.  However, SNCC volunteers Bertha Gober and Blanton Hall declined bail and chose to remain in jail over the holidays to dramatize their demand for justice.

 

After the holiday [November 25], more than 100 Albany State students marched from campus to the courthouse where they protested the arrest of Gober and Hall. A mass meeting–the first in Albany’s history–occurred at Mt. Zion Baptist church to protest the arrests, segregation, and decades of racial discrimination. The music, especially, was powerful, mirroring the Movement that had begun to emerge. Reflecting on this moment, Bernice Johnson Reagon [Cordell Reagon’s future wife] said, “When I opened my mouth and began to sing, there was a force and power within myself I had never heard before. Somehow this music … released a kind of power and required a level of concentrated energy I did not know I had” (Albany 2).

 

The meeting and the march were held after the SNCC notified the Department of Justice that the city of Albany did not follow the Interstate Commerce Commission ruling which prohibited discrimination in interstate bus and railway stations (Movement 1).

 

With the community now energized, recently arrived SNCC field secretary

Charles Jones met with Sherrod and Reagon to discuss their next move. The challenge

faced now by the organizers was how best to maintain the assault upon Albany’s

segregation without alienating more cautious and conservative members of the

movement, who still favored petitioning the city council. Should SNCC push too hard,

they feared being branded as agitators. Community support was not yet so strong as to

permit the SNCC members to call for demonstrations that required mass arrests and

filling the jail. On the other hand, the men did worry that if they did not push hard

enough, the Movement would lose enthusiasm rapidly. Sherrod, Reagon, and Jones

decided to appeal for outside support.  …

 

The SNCC workers settled on the solution of asking James Forman, executive

director of SNCC, to organize a Freedom Ride to Albany in an attempt to raise and

maintain community support. Forman agreed, and enlisted eight others to join him in

integrating Albany’s interstate terminal. By using the Freedom Riders, Sherrod, Reagon,

and Jones hoped to avoid charges of provocation, while maintaining the enthusiasm for

protest in the Albany community.  …

 

On December 10, 1961, nine Freedom Riders from Atlanta arrived at the Albany

Trailways bus terminal and were met by a crowd of approximately three hundred black

onlookers and a squad of Albany policemen. Chief Pritchett arrested the riders without

incident, telling the press that white Albany would “not stand for these troublemakers

coming into our city for the sole purpose of disturbing the peace and quiet in the city of

Albany,” framing the city’s opposition in domestic rather than racial rhetoric.  The

arrests resulted in the desired galvanization of the black community. The following day,

mass meetings filled Shiloh Baptist and Mount Zion Churches. With the continuation of

support, movement leaders, specifically the SNCC secretaries, began implementing their

ultimate strategy of filling the jail in order to force the city into negotiations (Nelligan 13-14).

 

That night we had a meeting of the Albany Movement at which time we decided that we would not let these people stay in jail alone, we would fill up the jails. That next morning, at breakfast, I [Dr. Anderson] was advising my wife and my kids that their father and husband would very likely wind up in jail before the week was out, because the Albany Movement had decided that the best way to respond to first ignoring the petition of the Albany Movement, and secondly to arresting these Freedom Riders, the… the most appropriate response would be mass demonstrations. And I said, "I'll probably wind up in jail, and I want you kids to understand why this is being done" (Interview 4). 

 

Leaders called for volunteers to march on city hall the following morning.  Privately, Sherrod recognized the importance of getting people into jail and keeping them

there, and evidence suggests that he told his closest supporters of this fact. This “jail, no

bail” strategy, however, was evidently not shared with the masses assembled in Shiloh

and Mount Zion, or even with other members of the movement. Anderson, while fully

expecting to be arrested himself, stated “we had no provisions for these people going to

jail because we did not anticipate mass arrests.”  While Anderson acknowledged the

strategy of filling the jails, he also was not prepared for mass arrests. It is likely Anderson believed that few arrests would be necessary in order to completely swamp the jail facilities, and that the arrest of the movement leaders and a few others would compromise the Albany police department’s ability to make arrests.  It is unclear how many of those preparing to march were aware that they might be arrested. The last time the black community marched to city hall, the police arrested no one, and it is possible that many assumed that the same would be true.

 

This is significant because for African Americans living in Albany, and in

southwest Georgia in general, arrest and jail represented personal endangerment. Anderson communicated the public opinion of jailing, stating “You have to understand

that going to jail was probably one of the most feared things in rural Georgia. There were many blacks who were arrested in small towns in Georgia never to be heard from

again… going to jail was no small thing.”  Horrible conditions in local jails were well

known to many, and it is important that many who agreed to march initially may have

done so without preparation for extended stays in jail, which placed strain upon people

economically, families especially.  … the Movement was poised to test the resolve of the

community through a baptism of fire, namely by sending hundreds of supporters to

prison.

 

The following day, over four hundred people marched to city hall in downtown

Albany, protesting the arrest of the Freedom Riders. The city gave the marchers

permission to circle the block twice, and when the marchers refused to stop after the

allotted distance, Pritchett ordered the protestors arrested.  Herding the protestors into

the alley between police headquarters, Pritchett arrested 267 protestors, including Sherrod and Reagon, and many of their young supporters (Nelligan 15-16).  

 

Dr. Anderson narrated: But on this Monday morning following the arrests on Sunday, we met at a church, and we started a march downtown, and we were going to walk around the courthouse and go back to the church. We made it around the first time and I was at the head of the line with my wife. But after we made it around the first time not getting arrested I went on to my office, but the group went around a second time to make this impression that we are united behind these people that you have unjustly arrested. But the second time around they were arrested. And some 700 were arrested before they stopped (Interview 5).

 

The Movement continued to hold meetings in Shiloh and Mount Zion, sending two hundred and two protestors to jail the following day. In response to these marches, Pritchett informed the press that “We can’t tolerate the NAACP or the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee or any other ‘nigger’ organization to take over this town with mass demonstrations.”

 

Despite almost five hundred arrests since the Freedom Ride, the Albany jail was not full. This presented a problem for the “jail, no bail” strategy of the Movement. Pritchett had not been forced to turn away those whom he had arrested and therefore would not soon be forced into concessions. Pritchett, who had been warned of the possibility of mass marches, had devised a plan to ensure that his jail would never be full. Pritchett planned to use jails in the surrounding counties to house Albany prisoners should their number threaten to swamp his facilities. As he stated, “plans had been made where we had the capability of 10,000 prisoners, and never put one in our city jail.”  As Pritchett himself attested, the protestors “were to be shipped out to surrounding cities in a circle…we had fifteen miles, twenty five miles, forty five miles, on up to about seventy miles that we could ship prisoners to.”  Pritchett had seen to it that Albany would not be required to pay for the prisoners to be housed in other jails, as local law enforcement had agreed to absorb the cost so as to protect the segregationist cause. Pritchett did insist that his own men police the jails themselves, however, in order to maintain control over Albany prisoners.  This maneuver dealt the Movement a significant setback, as no one conceived of Pritchett’s ability to increase his jail capacity this drastically.

 

For many of those arrested the realization that they were going to jail not in their hometown of Albany but rather in outlying areas such as “Bad” Baker County struck terror into their hearts. Prison conditions were harsh, with jail cells packed to many times their intended capacity. One woman described her cell in the Camilla jail designed to accommodate twenty prisoners being packed with over eighty-eight women.  Andrew Young, describing Albany jail conditions as “harrowing,” described jailors refusing to heat the jail in the winter, and raising the heat and closing the windows on hot days.  James Forman reported that many of those jailed spent most of their time “wondering when they would get out of jail,” suggesting that the expectation of staying in jail was not one most people were aware of. Some voiced their astonishment when they werearrested. One young woman stated “I didn’t expect to go to jail for kneeling and praying at city hall.”  The misery of sitting in jail cells far from home sapped the resolve of many of those who initially agreed to march and risk arrest. Along with the fact that many of those arrested did not expect to be, the mass jailing of Albany blacks presented the Movement with an enormous strategic problem. The infeasibility of filling the Albany jail meant that the basic strategy proposed by SNCC and supported by the Movement could not be successful. While admirable, the suffering of Albany residents in jail

accomplished little and represented an exercise in futility. This lack of concrete result would have a profound effect on the consciousness of the Albany African-American community (Nelligan 16-18).

 

 

Works cited:

 

“Albany Movement formed.”  SNCC Digital Gateway.  Web.  https://snccdigital.org/events/albany-movement-formed/

 

Browning, Joan C.  “Conflicting Memories of the Albany Freedom Ride and Albany Movement: An excerpt from: Who, What, When, Where? — Success or Failure?”  Veterans of the Civil Rights Movement.  Web.  https://www.crmvet.org/comm/00albany.htm

 “Interview with Dr. William Anderson.”  Eyes on the Prize Interview.  November 7, 1985.  Washington University Digital Gateway Texts.  Web.   http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb/and0015.1042.003drwilliamganderson.html

“The Albany Movement.”  African American Civil Rights Movement.  Web.  http://www.african-american-civil-rights.org/albany-movement/

 

Nelligan, Brendan Kevin.  “Lessons of Albany: Civil Rights Protest in Albany, Georgia 1961-62.”    Providence College: DigitalCommons@Providence.  Fall 2009.  Web.  https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=student_scholarship

 

“October 1961: SNCC Arrives in Albany.”  SNCC Digital Gateway.  Web.  https://snccdigital.org/events/sncc-arrives-in-albany/